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INTRODUCTION

American law and legal scholarship are confused these days about the
meaning of autonomy, including the autonomy of children. In two
significant recent cases, Bethel School District v. Fraser' and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,2 the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify
this confusion as it affects public school students. However, the positive
influence, that these cases offer to American education is not widely
appreciated among legal scholars. Indeed, both within and beyond the
school context, many child advocates are actively seeking to establish the
legal notion that children are presumptively autonomous persons,3 a
concept that departs significantly from the Supreme Court's understanding.
Our analysis of autonomy ideology, especially when applied to
children in public schools, convinces us that it is in children's and society's
best interests to limit children's short-term legal autonomy in order to
facilitate development of their long-term actual autonomy. A review of
lower court applications of Hazelwood since 1988 suggests that most
American judges now read that case as strengthening the authority of public
schools to nurture student development toward this ultimate goal.
In Part I, this Article discusses the development of autonomy ideology
and introduces its application in the context of American public schools.
Part II describes how the lower courts have applied Hazelwood and
explores the principles for which that case now stands. Part III provides
Provost and Professor of Law, Brigham Young University.
Associate, Kimball, Parr, Waddaups, Brown & Gee, Salt Lake City, Utah. We thank Eric
Lind, Joy Miner Hafen, and the staff of the St. John's Law Review for their assistance.
' 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
2 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
3 See, e.g., BRUCE C. HAFEN & JONATHAN 0. HAFEN, Abandoning Children to Their
Autonomy: the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming
1996).
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a brief conclusion and a comment on the way Hazelwood contributes to
constitutional reasoning about autonomy by distinguishing between what
state agencies tolerate and what they promote.
I.

AUTONOMY AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS

A.

Autonomy as PhilosophicalIdeology: An HistoricalSketch
Before focusing on students' rights, we offer a brief summary of
Western intellectual history that suggests how autonomy has come to play
its currently prominent role in modern legal and social thought.4 Since
ancient times, people have sought a frame of reference that gives order and
meaning to "life," not only to life in general, but to one's individual life
as well- "my life." A major contribution of ancient Greek thought was the
idea that there is a natural order to the universe, and that humankind would
fulfill its highest purpose by living in harmony with that natural order.
Thus, the meaning of "my life" was to be found with reference to a
surrounding natural framework for "life" in a larger and more objective
sense.
For many centuries before 1500 a.d., the dominant frame of reference
in European society was a religious view of the world. Given that
framework, the meaning of "life" as a universal construct was defined by
Christian religious teachings. The source of meaning for "my life" was
defined as living in harmony with those larger-scale teachings about "life."
The revolutionary age that began with the Renaissance emphasized at
its very core the significance of individual freedom, thereby giving new
meaning to the value of "my life" for each person. This strong sense of
personal liberty was especially significant as a political concept, becoming
a major premise of the American Revolution and the U.S. Constitution.
Ideas about the importance of individual choice also led to the development
of a free market economy, which in turn hastened the coming of the
Industrial Revolution. At the same time, the triumph of individualism in
this revolutionary era did not alter Western culture's basic assumption that
the universe was based on ordering principles of Nature; rather, the
revolutions in science and culture simply shifted the prevailing assumptions
from a religiousexplanation of the cosmos to a scientific explanation. Even

' For succinct and readable reference material on the topics discussed in this subsection, see
FRANKLIN L. BAUMER, MAIN CURRENTS OF WESTERN THOUGHT (1978): ROBERT C. SOLOMON,
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE 1750: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SELF (1988): THOMAS H.
GREER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD (5th ed. 1987); RONALD N. STROMBERG,
WESTERN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY SINCE 1945 (1975).
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with so dramatic a shift, Western thought continued to take for granted that
there is a natural and objective order within which each person can find a
sense of harmony and purpose. With or without religious assumptions, for
example, most people during this period believed in "human nature," the
notion that a set of inborn attitudes and moral instincts is common to all
men and women. Each person's individual makeup obviously varied, but
he or she still partook of this larger natural order, because people believed
that humanity "belonged" to, or was simply part of, Nature-or God's
creation. Each individual reflected "natural" impulses, because he or she
carried some of Nature within.
Thomas Jefferson began with this assumption in writing the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness." Immanuel Kant powerfully articulated the idea that each
person is born with a discoverable, inner set of moral standards.5 Similar
ideas are found in the more recent work of psychologist Carl Jung, who
discovered what he called "the collective unconscious," a universal sense
of humankind's collective "Self' reflected in the common patterns and
images of world religions and mythologies.
The history of Western civilization over the last hundred years,
however, recounts an erosion of confidence in the idea that there is any
fixed frame of reference, either "out there" or internally common to
everyone. Many of society's leading thinkers have become skeptical not
only about the particular ordering principles furnished by religion, science,
or some other source; they also doubt that there is any such thing as a set
of natural, pre-existing principles at all.
This unsettling mindset is a major theme of twentieth- century life.
As Tevya sang, "without our traditions our lives would be as shaky as a
fiddler on the roof." And life has begun to feel just that shaky. Viktor
Frankl, who survived a German concentration camp for Jews, echoed
Tevya's worry: "The traditions that had buttressed man's behavior are now
rapidly diminishing. No instinct tells him what he has to do, and no
tradition tells him what he ought to do; soon he will not know what he
wants to do." 6
We see this rejection of traditional patterns and assumptions in many
expressions of twentieth-century art, music, and literature. Art forms

5 SOLOMON, supra note 4, at 38.
6 VIKTOR FRANKL. MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 168 (1959).
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really do mirror the society that produces them. The true, the good, and
the beautiful are now less likely to be defined by traditional objective
standards that most people accept; rather, the standards for judgment now
tend to be in the eye of the artist, the writer, and the beholder. Many
traditional patterns of rhythm, harmony, and aesthetic quality have been
uprooted in favor of sometimes incomprehensible abstractions that represent
only the author's subjective "I-centeredness."
When Nietzsche wrote in the late 19th century that "God is dead," he
"meant [the death] not only [of] the God of the Judeo-Christian faith but
[also of] the whole realm of philosophical absolutes, from Plato down to
his own day." We have since lived through a century of uncertainty and
anxiety, fears that have been greatly aggravated by world wars, threats of
economic collapse, and the risk of nuclear annihilation. These worries
have become widely shared, partly because of nearly universal education
and communication, which cause the philosophical problems that once
bothered only the elite few now to bother almost everybody.
In the middle of this turmoil rages a central fear: if there is no
objective order, no natural framework for "life" in general, then all values
are relative and "my life" is without foundation or meaning. Of course,
this same circumstance also produces a perverse sense of liberation: with
no fixed framework, I can do as I please, without accountability.
As modern writers have struggled to make sense of the uprooting of
our traditions, a new form of individualism has emerged as a predominant
anchor point. Ours is the age of "the celebration of the self."7 This time,
however, the individual does not exercise her precious agency as part of a
surrounding field of natural order.'
Rather, "man makes himself,"
meaning "it is the individual who gives meaning to history, not the other
way around." 9 Thus, "there is no final truth about human beings; they are
what they choose to be."'" We cannot assume that "all people everywhere are ultimately like us,"" because "there is no such thing as human
nature. "'2
In the post-modern age, many scholars now see a new island of
apparent certainty in this sea of turmoil, one last absolute: the sanctity of
individual autonomy, which they would now isolate from and exalt above

7 SOLOMON, supra note 14, at 194.
s See id. at 195.
I0

Id. at 174 (quoting Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80)).
Id. at 178.

Id. at 196.
1-

SOLOMON, supra note 14. at 195.
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any particular social or natural context. In these scholars' view, we need
pick up only one piece from our shattered cultural consensus-the piece
called "my life." Then we can reconstruct a sense of meaning, but not one
that begins from a larger set of surrounding principles or human connections. Instead, other people and the universe itself must find their meaning
by reference to "my life" as the starting point.
The "selfs" ongoing conflict with traditional values is captured in the
contemporary comic strip "Calvin and Hobbes."
[Calvin] is a little boy (implausibly given the name of a stem
Protestant theologian) asserting that what he wants-fame, luxury,
diversion, staying out of school, hitting Susie with a snowball-is all that
should matter.
I am the center of the universe, he says; values are what I say they
are.
And then there is the tiger [Hobbes] (paradoxically given the name
of an English philosopher [whose writings] pretty much defend [Calvin's]
view), who offers the sober judgment of [traditional] 3mankind about this
self-centeredness, all in the language of gentle irony.'
Philosopher James Q. Wilson believes that discovering why "Calvin is
usually wrong and Hobbes is almost always right" is "the fundamental
moral issue of our time," because that inquiry will reveal our basis for
making any moral judgments. 4
The post-modernist arguments that challenge claims to objective truth,
especially when such claims are based on traditional hierarchical value
systems, nonetheless have great value. These arguments are forcing a reexamination of historical assumptions, sometimes unmasking entrenched
patterns of unfairness against socially marginalized persons and groups.
The personal interests and biases of some organizations and individuals
have at times masqueraded as objectively fixed and neutral standards, and
such forms of pretense need to be unmasked.
We wish to emphasize from this historical context primarily the point
that the contemporary "preoccupation with the autonomy of the individual
and the exaltation of his subjective longings" sometimes seems bent on
"obliterating," not merely on "reforming," society.' 5
Moreover, the
modem preoccupation with the subjective, autonomous "self' is a complete

'3 James Q. Wilson, PrivateActs Not Beyond Moral Scrutiny, Pope Says, DESERET NEWs,
Nov. 28, 1993, at A16.
"4 Id.; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993) (discussing human impulses
of sympathy, fairness, self-control, and duty in context of social, moral and gender identity).
15R.V. Young, The Old New Criticism and Its Critics, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at
38.40-42.
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reversal of the earlier assumptions by which individuals found personal
meaning and purpose in larger spheres of meaning. Many of those prior
assumptions, at least after the Renaissance, enhanced social strength in
ways that developed and prolonged individual liberty, in part by anchoring
ideas about personal freedom within thought systems designed to ensure
long-term cultural stability. These thought systems are the origin of our
understanding about children's needs, and society's obligations, to
prepare-not merely declare-children for a life of de facto-not merely de
jure-autonomy.
The development of Western jurisprudence has paralleled this larger
pattern of intellectual history. The general idea of natural law dominated
legal thinking from Aristotle to Aquinas to John Locke, reflecting views of
law that were consistent with larger assumptions about the existence of a
natural order beyond-or as a common pattern within-each individual. But
during the last century, the larger assumptions have changed drastically,
and the dominant legal theories changed with them. Natural law was
succeeded by legal positivism, legal realism, and most recently by the
critical legal studies movement.
Another recent theory, which some call "neo-natural law," has
emerged in the work of such scholars as Ronald Dworkin and John
Rawls. 16 Neo-natural law theory holds that there are some moral
absolutes, which purportedly distinguish this view from the relativism of
most prior twentieth-century legal theory.
A beginning premise in this vision of moral absolutes is the primacy
of individual autonomy. A simple example of the hypothesis of neo-natural
law is the statement that kids are people too-meaning, each person,
regardless of age, is inherently endowed with absolute autonomy that
presumptively trumps the claims on that person asserted by other persons
or groups. This theory also emphasizes the autonomy rights of the least
advantaged-those whose personhood has been most abused by the
traditional assumptions of law and social power during the recent past. 17
Thus, children's relative lack of capacity arguably places them among the
least advantaged, entitling them even more to be "left alone" in their
theoretical autonomy. The problem with this approach, of course, is that
it can abandon children to their legal autonomy before they have developed
their capacity for responsible autonomous action.

16 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
17 See RAWLS, supra note 16, at 151.
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"DeJure" vs. "De Facto" Autonomy
Premature grants of legal autonomy can ironically undermine
children's development of actual autonomy. Thus, we question the use of
autonomy rights theory as a premise for legal reasoning about children, but
not because we doubt the value of real autonomy. Indeed, the idea of
personal freedom has transcendent significance. We find no idea more
compelling than the concept that each individual personality is unique, free,
enduring, and even everlasting. But precisely because each person matters
so much, our question is, how can we help our children realize their
potential-and their culturally embedded right-to achieve truly meaningful
autonomy?
For example, a child is not "free" to play the piano just because no
physical force keeps her from walking to the piano bench. She will
achieve the freedom to make music only when she has developed the
capacity to obey the laws of music. Consider similarly a child who wants
to write a paper in a public school. Does this child have "freedom of
expression" merely by being left alone at his desk? He may be free of all
censorship or restraint, but is that enough? "Freedom of expression" can
indeed mean freedomftom restraints, but freedom of expression also means
freedom for expression-which means having the capacity for understanding and self-expression. If free speech is to be meaningful, a citizen must
not only be free to speak but should have something worth saying, together
with the maturity, insight, and skill needed to say it intelligibly.
To help our children develop real autonomy, we must help them
temporarily submit their immediate freedom to the schoolmaster of
educational discipline, limiting their freedom temporarily through
"compulsory education" that enhances their capacity for the meaningful
exercise of freedom. Because many people fail to see the need for
education of this kind these days, it just might be that young people today
have never had so much freedom of speech with so little that is worth
saying.
For our children's own sake, we must often limit children's legally
bestowed ("de jure") autonomy in the short-run in order to maximize their
actual ("de facto") autonomy in the long-run. Such limits are essential not
only to develop their own ability to function independently, but also to
sustain in perpetuity the social conditions that will continually regenerate
autonomous capacity within each new individual. Both the law and
common sense tell us to gradually remove, adapt, and customize these
B.
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limits as a child grows toward autonomous capacity.'" However, many
modern attitudes prefer a short-range view of personal autonomy that
would remove such limits, regardless of the effects on society or the
damage to the long-term development of meaningful personal autonomy.
C. Autonomy in Public Schools
Rosemary Salomone describes the Supreme Court's student free speech
cases 19 in the language of autonomy, noting the tension in these cases
between "the autonomy of the student as a self-determining individual" and
"the authority of public school officials" as "protectors of community
values or preferences." 2 ° Many scholars and courts have interpreted
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District as a seminal
source for the view that students possess inherent autonomy. This view
believes that Tinker created an "anti-institutional presumption"2' about the
educational and disciplinary decisions of public school officials for nearly
two decades. Accordingly, some of these commentators are concerned
about the recent emphasis on "community values" articulated in Fraserand
Hazelwood, as this emphasis restores a new presumption of constitutional
validity for what schools decide-in apparent derogation of student
autonomy.22
The early student rights cases, however, like the other individual
rights cases of the 1960's, began not as a fundamental challenge to the core
educational authority of public schools, but as a recognition that the Bill of
'8

See

E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982).
C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood,

FRANKLIN

19 Rosemary

26 GA. L. REV. 253 (1992) (analyzing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969): Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982): Bethel Sch. Dist.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).

Salomone. supra note 19, at 266.
Id. at 318-19.
2- "Hazelwood's language concerning the mission of schools to inculcate community values.
• .. effectively transmits Tinker's anti-institutional presumption into a presumption of constitutional validity for the school's educational policy decisions. This presumption shifts the burden
of proof . . . to the students, who now must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion before
obtaining relief from a school prohibition." Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added): see also Stanley
Ingber, Liberty andAuthority: Two Facetsof the Inculcationof Virtue. 69 ST. JOHN'S L.REV. 421
(1995).
[Any effort to indoctrinate "official values" [in schools] is in tension with our designs
to have a democratic polity . . . To allow officials to inculcate values is to admit that
free speech protects expression only so long as the speaker has been conditioned to say
what those in authority accept. In [such] a society . . . freedom of speech is virtually
irrelevant.
Id. at 443 & n.122.
1

21
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Rights imposes limits on what schools may do as agents of the state. Yet,
as the number of individual rights cases grew during the 1970's and early
1980's, many legal scholars, educators, and judges became so fascinated
with First Amendment analysis that they began to assume that the
limitations on governmental power expressed in the free speech, establishment clause, and free exercise cases represented much more than a few
exceptional boundaries on a wide domain of school authority. Indeed,
these writers came to see First Amendment limitations as the major premise
for our primary reasoning about students and schools. The shift in
language from "individual rights" to "autonomy" over the past several
years is a subtle reflection of this change. The not-so-subtle result of such
thinking was to create an almost unconscious bias against institutional
action, requiring schools and other similarly situated institutions to justify
their core values and functions, as if they were a necessary evil rather than
agencies of liberation and enlightenment. Ironically, as explained
elsewhere,' this bias can itself undermine the schools' ability to do what
they were created to do. Consider three illustrations showing the effects
of this autonomy-based paradigm about public school students.
First, suppose one assumes that public schools should inculcate basic
values in their students. Where should one go to determine what values the
schools may-and should-teach? In their search for appropriate and
needed values, educators, lawyers, scholars, and judges are likely to begin
by consulting the prominent Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment
rights of students. Indeed, Barnette, Tinker, Pico, Fraser,Hazelwood, and
a few other cases have much to say about the issues that arise as schools
attempt to teach values to students. To assume, however, that these cases
are the primary sources of instructional authority in the nation's
schools-as if the schools would have no legitimate authority to teach
values had those cases not been decided-is too narrow a view. One
should not read into the recent "constitutionalization of education law" the
assumption that the legal doctrines explaining what schools may not do
without offending the First Amendment are the same legal doctrines or
even the same concepts that tell schools what they may or should do in the
first instance. The search to know what educational and cultural values the
schools should teach their students invites a much larger range of thought.2"

' See generally Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional
Authority: Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky. A ContemporaryProposalforReconciling the Free Speech
Clause with CurricularValues Inculcationin the PublicSchools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769
(1995) (pointing to international human rights concepts as source for identifying values that
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The paper prepared for this Symposium by Professor Stanley Ingberl
offers the second and third illustrations of how it is possible to exaggerate-and therefore misconstrue-the role of autonomy-based conceptions of
constitutional rights for students. For example, Ingber provides a valuable
context for thinking about student rights issues in his comparison of the
autonomy-based philosophy of individual rights found in the liberal
tradition of the Enlightenment with the connection-oriented philosophy of
civic republicanism.26 He recounts the way his own thought about
students has developed, moving from an individualistic to a republicanistic
view. Where he once believed that student free speech rights derived from
individualism's desire to promote autonomy and the marketplace of ideas,
he now believes that "when dealing with children, the significance of free
speech relates more to the communal interest of character development than
to the individual's concern for the protection of autonomy, an autonomy
that children do not yet fully possess." 27 This realization that "children
surely constitute the Achilles heel of ... liberal ideology" because they
lack the capacity to choose "among values without constraint from others
or the state"28 is similar to our own views.
Despite Professor Ingber's agreement with us on this perspective, his
view differs from ours regarding the respective roles of courts and schools
in developing students' understanding and abilities. We believe this
difference provides the third example of what happens when one overconstitutionalizes his or her understanding of autonomy in education law.
Ingber argues persuasively that schools must teach their students the
value of both liberty and order-a position we strongly share. In its
practical application, however, his view is more pessimistic than ours
regarding the schools' commitment and ability to teach such skills as
skepticism, tolerance, creativity, and free inquiry.' He takes the position
that, unless judges are actively enforcing students' free speech rights,
students simply will not learn these skills.3" In urging that the educational
decisions of school teachers and officials need closer judicial scrutiny than

may-and should-be taught).

supra note 22.
at 430.
27 Id. at 474.
28Id. at 440.
29Ingber, supra note 22, at 444 (arguing that inculcating positive values of individual dignity.
independent inquiry, and willingness to question authority in structural, disciplined pedagogical
environment sends mixed signals to students).
-1Id. at 456-57 ("[Teachers] accustomed to wielding power cannot readily see issues from
the perspective of [the students] who are the subjects of their authority.").
25 Ingber,
26 Id.
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allowed by the Hazelwood standards (which allow judicial review of
educators' discretion in extreme cases), 3' he writes that students need
more than "predigested ideas,, 32 and that Hazelwood's restrictions on the
rule of Tinker have rendered "[t]he domain of critical, independent
thought" to be "limited indeed.""
This approach assumes that educators lack pedagogical skill or that
they place little value on teaching their students the entire range of
intellectual skills that create autonomous capacity. It further assumes that
the authentic student experience with "the free speech virtues of participation and tolerance"' occurs primarily when students, with the help of
courts, overrule the educators who seek to instruct them. Yet Professor
Ingber offers no evidence for his implicit belief that, unless they face the
threat of judicial intervention, public school teachers cannot or will not use
their educational discretion to teach "the need to tolerate diversity, the thrill
of independent thought, and the empowerment gained by questioning
authority. 35 In our view, Hazelwood encourages and enables teachers to
teach these and other vital skills better than they would teach them if they
lacked confidence in the authority-and responsibility-of their own
teaching role, a level of uncertainty we believe prevailed in too many
schools prior to Hazelwood. Thus we believe that "schools as 36well as
courts can advance and protect the values of the first amendment.
To assume that only courts and lawyers who understand the nuances
of First Amendment law possess the understanding and the will to teach the
skills of critical inquiry is similar to the overly narrow assumption noted
above that schools should inculcate in their students only those values
explicitly identified in First Amendment case law.
To be sure, First Amendment case law provides an important source
for understanding the constitutional limitations on the educative role of
public schools. Those cases obviously emphasize and illustrate that schools
should teach the values of participation, tolerance, and expression. These

31See Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelvood School District and the Role of the First
Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L. J. 685, 693 ("[Ihe Hazelvood standard involves two
stages of inquiry: courts must first ask whether the student expression at issue occurs in a context
that implicates the school's educational mission and must then ask whether the educator's decision
has a rational-but not necessarily an explicitly educational-basis.").
-- Ingber. supra note 22, at 441.
3 Id. at 452. Professor Ingber refers here to Hazelwood's holding that teachers and school
administrators may reasonably regulate student expression within a school's educational environment
(as distinguished from a student's personal speech in non-educational contexts).
34

Id.

5 Id. at 474 n.267.
.6 Hafen, supra note 31, at 685 (DUKE L.J.).
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values, however, are but a fraction of the entire complex of values the
schools must teach. First Amendment doctrine is not the primary authority
or source of reasoning to explain the affirmative purpose of public school
education. Honoring the limits by which schools conduct their educational
enterprise can obviously teach students some constitutional and educational
values. But schools constantly teach those same values in their own way,
and they exist to teach many other values as well. Moreover, the rationale
for constitutional limits is not the primary rationale on which schools rest.
Public schools were not created by the Bill of Rights. They are creatures
of state law, empowered by the plenary authority of state constitutions and
state legislative action, established to provide, as stated by the example of
the California Constitution, "intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement" among children.37
That broad educational mandate obviously reaches very important
limits when a public school invades the religious liberty of a Jehovah's
Witness child by coercing that child to pledge allegiance to the flag,38 or
when a school principal punishes a secondary school student for wearing
a black arm band to protest the Vietnam War in a non-disruptive way,79
or when a school board requires its students to engage in religious worship
or prayer. But these cases mark the extreme boundaries of school authority
as circumscribed by the First Amendment. Such cases are not the
fountainhead of schools' authority. For that reason, the Supreme Court's
recent language in Fraserand Hazelwood describing schools and teachers
as role models who should teach "the habits and manners of civility"'
and other "shared values of a civilized social order"'" is not an amazing
new charter of the autonomy rights of teachers and principals in derogation
of the autonomy rights of students; rather, that language simply reaffirms
and illustrates the broad authority and responsibility on which public
schools have always drawn to teach their students all of the values and
skills that enable true autonomy.42
Thus, to begin the analysis of a school's actions with the presumption
that the school must justify any intrusion into its students' pre-existing
autonomy lets the exception swallow the rule. This approach contradicts
31CAL. CONST. art. IX. § 1 (Deering 1981).
31West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
31Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD,
NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
4'Id. at 683.
42 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("IT]he education of the
nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers ... and not federal judges.").
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the basic political theory on which American public schools are established.

Against this background, we now consider the approach of the Supreme
Court to issues of student autonomy in its free speech cases.
II.

FRASER AND HAZELWOOD: REINFORCING THE AUTHORITY OF

SCHOOLS To CARRY OUT THEIR EDUCATIONAL MISSION
A.

Students' Rights Cases Priorto Fraser and Hazelwood: Barnette,
Tinker, and Pico

Until 1943, the Supreme Court had not addressed the concept of
"students' rights." In the midst of World War II, the Court handed down

its opinion in 1st Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,43 holding that
a public school could not compel students who were Jehovah's Witnesses

to pledge allegiance to the American flag because such compulsion would
have a coercive effect on the students' religious beliefs.

The next major students' rights case arose about 25 years later-in the
midst of another war, this time in Vietnam, and at the height of the civil

rights movement4-when the Supreme Court recognized students' rights
of expression in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
45 In Tinker, the Court
District.
upheld the right of students to protest

U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War by wearing black arm bands on
school grounds. Tinker held that public school officials may not discipline

students for either actual or symbolic political speech unless that speech is
materially and substantially disruptive. 46 For years thereafter, many lower
courts interpreted Tinker's presumption favoring student speech as a

fundamental restriction on school officials' discretion in educational matters
concerning student speech. 47
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
a discussion of the context in which Tinker was decided, see Hafen, supra note 46,
at 691 (OHIO ST. L.J.).
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
4393
U.S. at 513. The Court recognized that school authorities do not possess absolute
control over students, and that students could not "be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved." Id. at 511. Students are entitled to freely express their
views unless a constitutionally valid reason for regulation of such speech is shown. Id. Speech
which results in a disruption of classwork, "substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others," however, would not be constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 513. The wearing of
black arm bands by Marybeth Tinker and her classmates in their famous cases was protected
speech because the students were peaceably expressing their views without disruption or disturbance of other individuals. Id. at 514.
1 See, e.g., Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees of Insts. of Higher Learning, 620
F.2d 516, 523-25 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding invalid and unconstitutionally vague a University
regulation requiring student demonstrations to be "wholesome"); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636,
4'

4For
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Such a reading of Tinker seemed buttressed by the Supreme Court's
holding in Board of Education, Island Trees School District v. Pico's in
1982. Relying heavily on Tinker and Barnette, the Pico plurality held that

public school officials may not arbitrarily remove books from school
library shelves based on the content of the books49 because school officials
would thereby infringe on students' constitutional right to receive
The Court limited this right, however, by expressly
information.'
acknowledging that public school officials have considerable discretion to
manage schools' affairs, such as determining the curriculum and the
original content of school libraries. 5 Thus, Pico established that students
have a limited right to receive information as well as the right to freedom
of expression.5 2
Fraser and Hazelwood: A Reaffirmation of Schools' Educational
Role
53
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit in Fraser v. Bethel School District
applied Tinker in determining whether a vulgar campaign speech given by

B.

a student at a school assembly should receive First Amendment protection.54 That court concluded that, because the evidence showed that the

speech had caused no real "disruption" in either the assembly or class-

638-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (enjoining school from disciplining student for remaining seated during flag
pledge); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joilet Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 425 F.2d 10, 14-15
(7th Cir.) (holding that non-disruptive publication and distribution of student newspaper was valid
exercise of students' rights), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Right to Read Defense Comm.
of Chelsea v. School Comm. of the City of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703, 714-15 (D. Mass. 1978)
(enjoining school from banning non-obscene book where book was relevant to courses taught and
no substantial interest was shown to justify infringement on students' rights).
4 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
4 Id. The Court noted that the books in question were library books which were "optional
rather that required reading." Id. at 867.
10457 U.S. at 868-69. The Court wrote that this right is essential to prepare students for
effective participation in society, and the library is an important place for students to -test or
expand upon" information or idea obtained from the classroom or other sources. Id.
5I The Court recognized the school's right to determine the original content of books in its
library, but specifically held that school boards could not remove books from library shelves in
an effort to "prescribe" their views on political, national, religious or other matters. Id. at 87072. Therefore, whether the removal of books from a school library deprives students of their First
Amendment rights depends on the motivation for such removal. Id. at 871.Id. at 867-69. The
Court found that the school's claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum could not
extend "beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom" into a voluntary area such as the
school library. Id. at 869.
52 457 U.S. at 867-68.
53 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
54Id. at 1357-65.
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rooms, Tinker's presumption in favor of student speech protected the

student's speech even though its content was vulgar.55

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,5 6 holding that the First

Amendment did not prevent school officials from disciplining students for
using offensive language at school functions.57 Moreover, the Court's
opinion contained language suggesting that it was altering Tinker's
presumptions by granting educators broader discretion to restrict student

speech.5 1 Some commentators and courts read the decision more narrowly, restricting its application to cases in which student speech was vulgar
or obscene.5 9 Fraser, nonetheless, turned out to be an important transi-

tional case leading from Tinker's presumption favoring student speech to
Hazelwood's affirmation of the institutional authority of schools to educate

students.6
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Fraser, the Eighth

5 755 F.2d at 1357-65. The Ninth Circuit rejected the three claims raised by the school
district on appeal. Id. at 1361-65. First, it rejected the argument that the school could discipline
the student because his speech had disrupted the school's ability to educate. Id. at 1361. The
court found that no disruption, in fact, had occurred. Id. at 1361. Second, the court held that the
district's interest in maintaining "civility" did not justify disciplinary action for offensive speech,
and was outweighed by the student's First Amendment rights. Id. at 1363. Finally, the court
concluded that the assembly was outside the compulsory classroom environment and that the
student was, therefore, protected by the first amendment in such an environment. Id. at 1363-65.
- Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 681-87. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized the need to balance the
freedom of speech in schools against society's interest in "teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior." Id. at 681. The Court reiterated its view that the constitutional
rights of students are not necessarily on the same level as the rights of adults, and concluded that
the manner of speech appropriate for a school classroom or assembly is a decision for the school
board to make. Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 685-86. We have previously speculated that the Fraser Court's reaffirmation of
schools' authority to educate may have been, in part, a response to empirical evidence from the
mid-1980's showing a decline in the academic quality of schools, which some researchers linked
to declines in teachers' authority to educate. See Hafen, supra note 46, at 692 (OHIO ST. L.J.);
see also infra notes 211-212, and accompanying text. Thus, the historical settings of Tinker and
Fraserwere very different. See Hafen, supra note 46, at 692 (OHIO ST. L.J.) ("Just as the 1960's
asked for reassurance that students are people too, the early 1980's asked for reassurance that
schools should be more seriously devoted to meaningful education.").
" See e.g, Therese Thibodeaux, Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser: The Supreme Court
Supports School in Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech, 33 Loy. L. REV. 516.
522-23 (1987) (limiting holding to support of discipline for lewd or indecent speech), see also
Hafen, supra note 46, at 691 (OHIO ST. L.J.).
I In its decision, the FraserCourt hearkened back to its first free speech case involving
minors, in which Justice Stewart stated that "a child. . . is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. State
of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.. concurring).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:379

Circuit decided Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District.6' In Hazelwood,
the Eighth Circuit read Tinker as preventing school officials from removing
student stories from a school-sponsored newspaper, even though the stories
arguably violated the privacy of other students.62 Specifically, the court
held that no such supervision of student expression was permitted unless
the stories threatened to disrupt educational activities or constituted a
tortious invasion of the rights of others. 63 Because school officials were
unable to make this showing, the court ruled in favor of the students.'
In 1988, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit,' ruling that
school officials have broad authority to define and supervise students'
education, including the right to regulate the content of school-sponsored
student newspapers.'
The Court distinguished the private, passive
student expression at issue in Tinker from student expression in a schoolsponsored activity.67 More importantly, where school sponsorship is clear,
Hazelwood reversed the burden placed on school officials by Tinker,

61 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). We discuss the Hazelwood
case only briefly here. For a more complete analysis of this decision, see Hafen, supra note 46
(OHIO ST. L.J.); Hafen, supra note 54 (DUKE L.J.). But see Helene Bryks, Comment, A Lesson
in School Censorship: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 291 (1989) (criticizing
Hazelwood Court's application of previous precedent).
I The student newspaper stories at issue in Hazelwood were an article on student pregnancy
and an article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school. Hazelwood, 795 F.2d
at 1370-71. The school official who refused to allow publication of the articles was concerned
that private information about several identifiable students would be revealed in the pregnancy
article, and that allegations against a student's parent in the other article were to be published
without an opportunity for the parent to respond. Id. at 1371. The official decided that there was
no time to remedy the problems with the stories and therefore removed the pages on which those
stories were printed and allowed publication of the remainder of the issue. Id. at 1370-71.
63Id. at 1374-76. The court determined that the newspaper was a public forum rather than
merely part of the school's curriculum, and the school district, therefore, was required to demonstrate that the prohibition was necessary to avoid material interference with school work or the
rights of others. Id. at 1374.
64The court found no indication that the censored articles would have materially disrupted
classwork, and also found that no tort action could have been maintained against the school on
the basis of the articles. Hazelwood, 795 F.2d at 1375-76. Therefore, the officials were not
justified in censoring the articles under the Tinker standard. Id. at 1376.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
In reaching its conclusion the Court held that the newspaper was a limited purpose forum
rather than a public forum, and regulation of its contents was controlled by time, place, and
manner restrictions rather than the Tinker standard. Id. at 270.
67The Court distinguished the question in Tinker (whether a school must tolerate student
speech) from the issue in Hazelwood ("whether the First Amendment requires a school
affirmatively to promote particular student speech"). Id. at 270-71. Since the Court determined
that the newspaper was part of the school curriculum, it found that school officials could exercise
more control over content, in an effort to protect the students and prevent having the students'
views from being attributed to the school. Id. at 271.
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holding that regulation of student speech is permissible' so long as it is
"reasonably related to a legitimate educational purpose. 68
Some commentators and lower courts have since viewed Hazelwood

as merely a censorship or public forum case that applies to students using
school facilities. 69 The Supreme Court, however, recently confirmed in
Vernonia School District v. Acton 7° that Hazelwood means much more.
In Acton, the Supreme Court upheld the right of a school district to

administer random drug tests to student athletes.

Further buttressing

Hazelwood's holding that schools must have broad authority to fulfill their

educational mission, the Court in Acton made clear that "Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are
different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry
cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children." 7'
The Court stressed in Acton that students' rights are
necessarily restricted in a school setting because school teachers and

administrators "stand in loco parentis over children entrusted to them. In
fact, the tutor or schoolmaster is the very prototype of that [parental]
status."7

Unlike the authority of private schools, the "in loco parentis"

authority of public schools must be weighed against constitutional
constraints arising from the schools' role as state agents. Nonetheless, the

Court stated, "we have acknowledged that for many purposes [public]
school authorities act in loco parentis. " The Court also underscored the
changes wrought on Tinker by Hazelwood and Fraser: "while children
assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse

gate' the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in
school." 74 Thus, Acton's holding and its language make it difficult to

63Id. at 273; see also Thomas C. Fischer, Whatever Happened to Mary Beth Tinker and
Other Sagas in the Marketplace of Ideas, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 357-58 (1993).
Professor Fischer argues that Tinker represented the high-water mark of constitutionally-based
"students' rights." Id. at 358. He asserts that Hazelwood follows a trend in the lower courts to
significantly weaken the unwise and unworkable standard set forth in Tinker. Id. According to
Professor Fischer, the Court's Tinkerstandard, coupled with what some perceive as back-pedaling
in Hazelwood, "left the academy profoundly confused and significantly changed." Id.
69 See, e.g.. William Buss, School Newspapers, PublicForum, and the FirstAnendment. 74
IOWA L. REV. 505 (1989) (arguing that Hazelwood does not represent significant shift away from
Tinker).
70 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
71Id. at 2392.
7 Id. at 2391.
73Id. at 2392 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)).
74 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969). and citing, inter alia, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
(1988), and Fraser,478 U.S. at 683).
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argue that Hazelwood is anomalous.
Moreover, as summarized below, lower courts, like the Supreme
Court in Acton, have read Hazelwood broadly.75 These courts accept the
Supreme Court's recognition that school officials must have broad

discretion to pursue their primary educational mission of preparing children
for adulthood and full integration into society.76 Also implicit in the
following decisions is the premise that children's legal ("de jure")

autonomy must be subject to certain limitations in the short-run to
maximize the development of their actual ("de facto") autonomy in the
long-run." As we have attempted to explain elsewhere,7" recognition of
this premise is essential not only to develop children's individual capacity

but also to sustain in perpetuity the social conditions that will maintain a
democratic society populated by mature and self-reliant individuals.
C. Applying Hazelwood in the Lower Courts:A Fundamental Shift in

the Scope of School-Related Rights of Expression
Though lower courts have embraced Hazelwood with varying degrees
of enthusiasm, the decision has clearly changed the way courts apply First
Amendment speech analysis in contexts involving schools, students, and
even faculty.79 Although there are exceptions, most lower courts have

read Hazelwood as clarifying educators' authority to control student
expression for the sake of preserving the institutional and educational
integrity of public schools.'
These courts have also chosen to extend
Hazelwood's application beyond student newspaper cases and even student

7 See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' application of
Hazelwood doctrine).
See infra part II.C.
78 See Hafen, supra note 23 (OHIO ST. L.J.): supra note 31 (DUKE L.J.).
7' See Hafen, supra note 31, at 693-97 (DUKE L.J.) (discussing Supreme Court's First
Amendment analysis in Hazelwood).
o See Salomone, supra note 19, at 274-306. Post-Hazelwood lower court decisions have
answered many questions left open in Hazelwood. Id. These decisions tend to follow Hazelwood
in granting public school officials "broader legal discretion in molding student thought and
opinion and consequently expression into a shape that conforms with the dominant values of the
community." Id. at 315; see also Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of
Individual Rights: The FirstAmendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1, 81-82
(1990). The legal trend with regard to public schools is "unmistakably toward unquestioned
deference to the decisions of school administrators" confronted by student speech activities.
Ingber, supra, at 81. Mr. Ingber views this as a dangerous trend, allowing school officials to
permit only speech which they view as consistent with social acceptability. Id. This allows schools
to evade their character-building responsibilities, and instead gives children "improper signals
regarding democratic values and personal self-awareness." Id. at 86.
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speech cases."' These courts have also adopted Hazelwood's distinction
between toleration and promotion, holding that, while schools have a
responsibility to tolerate certain types of speech, they need not lend the

school's name or facilities to promote that expression.

2

1. Cases Turning on the Toleration/Promotion Distinction
As discussed more fully below, one of the most helpful additions to

constitutional law made by the Court in Hazelwood is its distinction
between toleration of student speech and promotion of student speech. 3

Hazelwood suggests that schools must tolerate students' personal speech
under most circumstances but that schools are not compelled to "promote"
speech of students or others in the school community by providing a
school-sponsored forum for expression.'

The underlying rationale for

this distinction is that students or even the public may reasonably believe
that schools endorse what they produce through official educational
channels. 85

For example, in Crosby v. Holsinger,86 the Fourth Circuit addressed
whether a school principal had the right to eliminate the school symbol, a

cartoon character called "Johnny Reb," after receiving complaints about the
symbol from black students and parents.' The court applied Hazelwood
to conclude that the principal's decision to change the symbol did not
violate the students' First Amendment rights to have a particular school
symbol.'
The court stated that "school officials need not sponsor or
promote all student speech," particularly if the public "might reasonably

81See Salomone, supranote 19, at 274 (noting wide range of cases interpreting Hazelwood).
I See Salomone, supra note 19, at 267-68 (explaining distinction between toleration and
promotion); see also Planned Parenthood of S. Nev. v. Clark, 941 F.2d 817, 830 (9th Cir. 1991)
(allowing school to remove textbook containing "vulgar and sexually explicit" material from
curriculum). Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing school to
disassociate itself from controversial school symbol because of educational concerns).
3 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988). Toleration "addresses
educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises," while promotion of speech "concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities" that the public might perceive
as expressing the school's own view. Id. at 271.
84 Id. at 270-73. In this context, the Court noted that a school could set very high standards
for student speech which could be attributed to the school itself. Id. at 272. A school could refuse
to sponsor student speech advocating unpopular or radical views, and could disassociate itself
from "any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy." Id. at 271-72.
8 Hazelvood. 484 U.S. at 271.
6 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988).
8 Id. at 802.
8 Id.
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perceive [the speech] to bear the imprimatur of the school." 8 9 The court
acknowledged that "[t]here is a difference between tolerating student speech
and affirmatively promoting it."''
In applying this standard, the court
held that because a school symbol bears the "stamp of approval" of the
school, school authorities are free to disassociate the school from such a
symbol. 91

In Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada v. Clark County School
District,' the federal district court originally held that school officials
were obliged to publish advertisements from Planned Parenthood in schoolsponsored publications, even though school officials believed that
publishing the advertisements might lead some people erroneously to
believe that the school favored or sponsored Planned Parenthood services.93 Shortly after the district court issued its opinion, the Supreme Court
decided Hazelwood. In light of Hazelwood, the district court withdrew its
original opinion and ruled in favor of the school. 94 The Ninth Circuit, en
banc, upheld the district court's revised opinion.95
Similarly, in Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, the
9 Id. at 802 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
90Id. at 802.
" Crosby, 852 F.2d at 803. Significantly, unlike the majority of courts applying Hazelwood,
the Fourth Circuit noted that the public forum doctrine did not apply to this case. Id. at 802 n.2.
" 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
9' Id. at 820.
4 Id.
9- Clark, 941 F.2d at 820. In Clark, the high school officials who authorized advertisements
in school-sponsored publications declined to accept advertisements for the services of Planned
Parenthood in student newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic programs. Id. The schools believed
that publishing the advertisements might affect their classes on sex education and otherwise put
the school imprimatur on one side of a controversial issue. Id. at 829. Citing Hazelwood. the
Ninth Circuit held that the school's publications were non-public forums because the school had
not opened the forum for indiscriminate use and had exhibited clear intent to retain control over
the forum. Id. at 823-29.
The court also rejected Planned Parenthood's argument that Hazelwood did not apply
because student speech was not involved. Id. at 827. The court held that because "[tihe
publication is the same and the audience is the same, whether the source for the speech is from
inside the school or outside, or is paid or free," and because the school has -the same
pedagogical concerns, such as respecting audience maturity, disassociating itself from speech
inconsistent with its educational mission and avoiding the appearance of endorsing views, no
matter who the speaker is," Hazelwood applies. Id.
In ruling in favor of the school, the court stated that "[a] school's decision not to promote
or sponsor speech that is unsuitable for immature audiences, or which might place it on one side
of a controversial issue, is a judgment call which Hazelwood reposes in the discretion of school
officials and which is afforded substantial deference." Id. at 829. Recognizing that deference, the
court found that the school's decision to refuse Planned Parenthood's advertisements was
reasonable. Id.
" 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Eleventh Circuit heard a challenge to a school board's decision to

discontinue use of a humanities textbook because the board believed it
contained vulgar and sexually explicit material.'

The court held, based

on Hazelwood, that school officials have the right to remove such material
from the curriculum because their actions are "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.""
The court reasoned that when

textbooks are used in the regular course of study, even when "optional
reading," they carry the imprimatur of school approval. 9 Therefore, the
court concluded that school officials had the right to remove textbooks."°
Likewise, in Gerig v. Board of Education of the Central School
0
District,"
' the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the right of a school
district to terminate a teacher who permitted articles of dubious literary
quality to be published in the student newspaper under his supervision. 0 2
Evidence supported the school's view that students would presume that the
newspaper's content bore the imprimatur of the school and that the school
condoned its contents.103 Thus, under Hazelwood, the Court ruled that

the school took reasonable action in terminating the teacher. "0
2.

Cases Upholding Tinker's Protection of "Personal" Student Speech

Given the expansion of Hazelwood's applicability, some may wonder
what is left of Tinker. Cases handed down since Hazelwood generally hold

1Id. at 1518.
3 Id. Motivation was not at issue in this case because the parties previously had stipulated
that the board's reasoning was related to the sexual and vulgar language in the textbooks, and the
court stated that it could not conclude that the Board's action was not reasonably related to the
stated legitimate concern. Id. at 1522-25.
99Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1522. The court found that the textbook was part of the overall school
curriculum, and the fact that the textbook was part of an elective course did not alter such
finding. Id.
100Id.; see also Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying
Hazelwood in allowing school officials to prohibit teaching of non-evolutionary creation where
subject was part of school curriculum).
101841 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
102The teacher taught English and media classes, and compiled a publication which was
intended only for his media class. Id. at 733. The objectionable publication included "explicit,
crude and tasteless sexual references, articles which promoted, or at least condoned, the use of
drugs, and articles accusing the [local] police of substance abuse." Id. Several copies of the
publication were circulated outside the media class, which led to the charges against the teacher.
Id. The court followed principles set out in Hazelwood to determine that the Board could
terminate the teacher for unacceptable conduct regardless of whether the publication was a
"teaching technique." Id. at 735.
103Gerig, 841 S.W.2d at 734.
' Id. at 735.
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that Tinker still protects "personal" student speech that is non-disruptive. 10 5 Thus, cases arguably controlled by Tinker generally focus on
whether student speech is "personal" or "school-sponsored" and whether
6
the student speech is manifestly disruptive.1
For instance, in Chandler v. McMinnville School District,1'7 two
high school students wore buttons supporting an ongoing teachers'
strike. 108 School administrators asked the students to remove the buttons,
stating that they were disruptive. The students filed suit against the school
district."0 The students feared further disciplinary action if they refused
to remove the buttons and argued that, therefore, their First Amendment
rights to freedom of expression had been violated."' In reversing the
lower court, which had dismissed the claim, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that because the buttons were not vulgar per se, school-sponsored, or
manifestly disruptive, the speech was permissible under Fraser,Hazelwood,
and Tinker."'
In Slotterback v. Interboro School District,"2 a Pennsylvania district
court considered whether a school district could be permitted to bar
students from distributing certain written materials, such as those that
"proselytize a particular religious or political belief."''
The court held

"0See hifra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (discussing cases upholding Tinker's
protection of "personal" student speech).
106See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
107978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).

11 Id. at 526. Two of those buttons displayed the slogans -I'm not listening scab" and -Do
scabs bleed?" Id. Similar buttons were distributed by the two students to other students at the
school. Id.
109Id.

WoChandler, 978 F.2d at 526. The school district moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. The district court granted the motion.
stating that the slogans on the buttons were offensive and inherently disruptive. Id. The students
argued on appeal to the Ninth Circuit that the case should be governed by Tinker rather than
Fraser.Id. at 527-28. The students contended that their case could be distinguished from Fraser
in three ways: (1) the buttons constituted silent, rather than sexually explicit, speech: (2) the
buttons expressed a political viewpoint, and were therefore entitled to greater protection: and (3)
the display of the buttons did not take place at a school-sponsored activity. Id. at 528.
" Chandler. 978 F.2d at 528-31. The court ruled that "the standard for reviewing the
suppression of vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser,schoolsponsored speech by Hazelvood, and all other speech by Tinker." Id. at 529 (citations omitted).
1' 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see also Salomone, supra note 19, at 283-85
(discussing application of Hazelwood in this case).
"3 Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 293. The school objected to the distribution by two students
of literature advocating a particular religion. Id. at 284. The students concentrated their efforts
outside the classroom, but did distribute the literature several times during classes. Id. The school
objected to the disruption and litter caused by the distributions, and came up with an official
"Procedure for Distribution of Non-School Written Materials." Id. at 285. The students
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that a public forum analysis would be inappropriate because "personal"

student speech was involved." 4

Drawing on the "toleration versus

promotion" language of Hazelwood, the Court determined that the student
speech in this case should be "tolerated"
under the standards of Tinker
5

because it was personal expression.1
3.

Cases Extending Hazelwood to Faculty Speech

Several lower courts have used Hazelwood's analysis to permit school
officials to restrict the free speech rights of faculty members."16 These

cases suggest that such restrictions are necessary to allow 7schools to

determine how they should fulfill students' educational needs."
For example, in VMrd v. Hickey,'I the First Circuit determined that
because a classroom discussion is a school-sponsored activity and a
classroom is not a public forum, a Massachusetts public school was
permitted under Hazelwood to impose reasonable restrictions on a teacher's
classroom speech." 9 The plaintiff, a biology teacher, claimed that the
local school district violated her First Amendment rights when it decided

not to reappoint her due, in part, to a classroom discussion in which she
discussed abortion of Down's Syndrome fetuses.120 The court found that
the school's decision in this case was "reasonably related to legitimate

contended that distribution of religious materials was speech protected by the First Amendment
and that the school's restrictions were invalid. Id. at 286.
"" Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 290-91. The court noted that even if public forum analysis
were applicable, a standard of strict scrutiny would be applied to the school officials' actions
because the school had established a designated public forum. Id. at 292-93. The court, however.
followed Tinker in applying strict scrutiny to the content-based portions of the school's
distribution policy, recognizing that "plaintiff's speech was personal. was not school-sponsored.
and occurred during school hours. . . ." Id. at 291.
115
Id. at 289-91. The court declared that the parts of the distribution policy which prohibited
distributions of religious and political literature were overbroad and facially invalid. Id. at 300.
1i6 See infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text (discussing cases extending Hazelwood to
faculty speech).
I7 For a discussion of restrictions placed on faculty speech, see Gregory A. Clarick, Note,
PublicSchool Teachersand the FirstAmendment: Protectingthe Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 693 (1990); Donna Prokop, Note, ControversialTeacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between FirstAmendment Rights and EducationalInterests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533 (1993).
I'l 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
19 Id. at 453-54.
,22
Ward, 996 F.2d at 450. Plaintiff also contended that the school failed to give her proper
notice of what speech was permissible. Id. at 451. The court found in this regard that a school
is not obligated to expressly prohibit all imaginable inappropriate conduct by teachers in an effort
to apprise teachers of what is "inappropriate." Id. at 454. Instead, the court ruled that the relative
inquiry is: "based on existing regulations, policies, discussions, and other forms of communication between school administration and teachers, [is] it reasonable for the school to expect the
teacher to know that her conduct [is] prohibited?" Id.
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pedagogical concerns" based on the age and sophistication of the students,
the relationship between teaching methods and valid
educational objectives,
2
and the context and manner of the presentation.
In a similar case, Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 22 the school
district reprimanded a teacher for making an inappropriate comment during

class regarding a rumor about the sexual activities of two students.
Applying Hazelwood, the Tenth Circuit determined that the school had
legitimate pedagogical interests in controlling the content of a teacher's
speech because such speech, in a classroom setting, "bears the imprimatur
of the school." 24 The court also referenced the significant educational
interests of the state as "educator," finding that such interests justify
restrictions on the speech rights of students and teachers."2 The school,

therefore, was justified in reprimanding the teacher, and the court refused
to "interfere with the authority of the school officials to select among
alternative forms of discipline. We will protect appropriate constitutional
interests. We should not and will not run the schools."' 26
Other cases demonstrate that the right of school officials to control the

curriculum can take precedence over the conflicting free speech rights of
28
teachers. 27 In Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District,
a public school teacher's contract was not renewed because, in part, the
teacher was teaching from his own individual reading list rather than the

'21Ward, 996 F.2d at 453. The court determined that a school committee could regulate a
teacher's classroom speech if: (1) "the regulation [was] reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern;" and (2) the teacher had been given advance notice of what conduct was
unacceptable and, therefore, prohibited. Id. at 452.
'
944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
Ild. at 774-75. The comment, an unsubstantiated rumor, arose during a classroom
discussion in which a student had asked the teacher to give specific examples of his assertion that
"the quality of the school had declined" in recent years. Id. at 774. Although the teacher
apologized to the principal for his bad judgment. he was reprimanded and put on paid
administrative leave for four days. Id.
'24
Miles, 944 F.2d at 776. In applying Hazeivood to this case, the court stated that -[a]
school's interests in regulating classroom speech . . . are implicated regardless of whether the
speech comes from a teacher or student." Id., 944 F.2d at 777.
12 Id. at 778-79. The school asserted several concerns to justify its actions: first, the school's
need to disassociate itself from speech it considers inappropriate: second, 'an interest in ensuring
that teacher employees exhibit professionalism and sound judgment;" and third, the school's need
to provide a proper educational atmosphere. Id. at 778. The court felt that the brief administrative
leave allowing the school to investigate the incident and the narrowly tailored reprimand were
reasonable in light of the school's legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id.
'2 Id. at 779.
7 See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
'2 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990).
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reading list approved by the school district. 2 9 The teacher contended
that the district's action violated his right to free expression under the First
Amendment. In upholding the school district's action, the Fifth Circuit
held that under Hazelwood, "school officials may impose reasonable
restrictions on the speech
of students, teachers, and other members of the
1 30
school community.
In Roberts v. Madigan,'3' a teacher sponsored a daily fifteen minute
silent reading period during which students were authorized to read
whatever they wished, including books from the teacher's library, which

included several religious books. During this same time, the teacher often
read his Bible silently. School officials asked the teacher to remove the
religious books from his classroom library and not to display the Bible
during the school day.'32 In upholding the school's action, the Tenth
Circuit stated in dictum that Hazelwood suggested that school officials may
impose speech restrictions on teachers as well as students. 31 3 Because the
school officials stated that they removed the books to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, the court based its holding on an Establishment
Clause analysis rather than on Hazelwood. '34
4.

Student Newspaper Cases

The Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood surprised many observers

3
because courts have seldom restricted speech found in newspapers.1 1

,. Id. at 795. The school district alleged several reasons for not renewing the teacher's
contract, including: poor supervision of one of his classes; below average evaluations; poor
interaction with students, parents, and members of the faculty; and the use of a non-approved
reading list. Id. at 795-96. It was the policy of the school that if a teacher was dissatisfied with
the approved reading list, he or she could supplement it or use a substitute list if administrative
approval was obtained. Id. at 796.
0 Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800-01 & n.18 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 267 (1988)). Plaintiff failed to prove that his reading list was constitutionally protected
speech, or that the list was the motivating factor behind the decision not to rehire him. Id. at 797801. The court concluded that "the First Amendment does not vest public school teachers with
authority to disregard established administrative mechanisms for approval of reading lists." Id.
at 795. Recognizing the school's pedagogical interests in shaping the curriculum, the court noted
that "[t]he first amendment has never required school districts to abdicate control over public
school curricula to the unfettered discretion of individual teachers." Id.
"1,921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992).
132Id. at 1049.
," Id. at 1056.
*. Id. at 1056-58.
135See Salomone, supra note 19, at 253-55 (discussing shock over Hazelvood decision). But
see J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, Comment. End of an Era? The Decline of Student
Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 1988 DUKE L.J. 706
(arguing that independent school newspapers and newspapers at college level are left unaffected
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Since Hazelwood, however, lower courts such as in Gerig v. Board of
Education, discussed above, have recognized a school's right to control the
Nevertheless, several state
content of official school newspapers. 36
courts have found Hazelwood inapplicable to student newspaper cases.' 37
For example, in Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, 13 an eighth grade student claimed that his First Amendment rights
were violated when the school refused to publish two movie reviews he
submitted to the school newspaper because the movies being reviewed-Rain Man and Mississippi Burning-were rated R. 139 The New
1
40 holding
Jersey Superior Court distinguished this case from Hazelwood,
that the school had failed to show a valid educational purpose for the
censorship.' 4' The court concluded that because there was nothing
offensive in the article and the school had not censored it because of poor
literary style, the school must have censored the article because it disagreed

by Hazelwood).
136 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
138630 A.2d 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 647 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1994).
139The student offered to insert a disclaimer that the movies being reviewed were not
endorsed by the school, but both the faculty advisor and the school superintendent felt that such
a disclaimer would not sufficiently counteract the implied endorsement of R-rated movies.
Desilets, 630 A.2d at 335. The student also pointed out that reviews of three other R-rated movies
had appeared in the newspaper. Id. The school responded that those reviews had been permitted
because the school district did not yet have a full understanding of the implications and holding
of Hazelwood. Id.
The state trial court found that the school officials' actions were permissible under
Hazelwood, rejecting plaintiffs argument that Hazelwood did not apply because the student
newspaper was not part of the regular school curriculum. Id. at 336. The students met after
school to work on the newspaper and did not receive credit for their work. The trial court.
however, also ruled that the New Jersey Constitution contained a more expansive view of the
student right of expression than the federal Constitution as interpreted by Hazelwood. ld.. 630
A.2d at 336. The state standard, according to the trial court, required the school to show that
there was no less oppressive alternative to the censorship. Id. The trial court then held that a
disclaimer was a less-intrusive means of accomplishing substantially the same result as total
censorship of the reviews. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court but declined to apply a
state constitutional analysis. Id. Instead, the appellate court based its decision solely on federal
constitutional law. Id. at 336-39.
"4The appellate court found that Hazelvood applied to school-related activities "[a]s long
as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart knowledge or skills to the
student participants," even when students do not receive academic credit for their work and the
work is done after regular school hours. Desilets, 630 A.2d at 338 (quoting Hazelwood).
"' The court indicated that students would not regard the review as an endorsement of Rrated movies by the school as long as a disclaimer was inserted into the article. Desilets. 630
A.2d at 339-40. This approach would appear to be the "no less intrusive means" approach
advocated by the trial court but ostensibly rejected by the appellate court.
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with its subject matter. Thus, the court ruled that "the pedagogical
the school do not extend beyond the style and content of the
interests 4of
2
1

article."

At least one other lower court has refused to apply Hazelwood as

controlling precedent in student newspaper cases where the plaintiff based
his claims on state law. In Leeb v. DeLong, 43 the California Court of
Appeals heard a case with facts similar to those of Hazelwood. The student
editor of a high school newspaper submitted an April Fool's issue to the
school's principal for approval. The principal concluded that a portion of

the issue contained innuendo damaging to the reputations of certain featured
students, and refused to permit distribution of the issue.'"
The student editor sued the school district, claiming an infringement
of his rights of expression under the Constitution of California. 45 The
court found that if HazeIwood were applicable in California, the case would
have easily been decided in the school district's favor.'" A California
statute, however, provides student editors with the right to control the
editorial content of student newspapers with very limited exceptions. 47
Consequently, the court ruled that "[a] school district in this state may

censor expression from official school publications which it reasonably
believes to contain an actionable defamation, but not as a matter of taste or
pedagogy.'"

"I Desilets, 630 A.2d at 339. The majority's opinion draws the questionable distinction
between subject matter and content. Id. at 339-40. Under the majority's approach to Hazelwood,
despite the objections of school officials, any subject could be addressed in a school newspaper
as long as the content of the article itself was not obscene and the style was not objectionable.
Id. One can easily defend the position that the school did have a legitimate pedagogical objective
in exercising control over the subjects addressed in school newspapers, as did Judge D'Annunzio
in his dissenting opinion which favored the school's actions under a Hazelwood analysis. Id. at
339-42.
143
243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
' Leeb, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495. The issue reported that Michael Jackson was planning a
concert at the school, that the Los Angeles Raiders were going to play the school football team,
and that spring break had been cancelled due to lack of interest. Id. On the third page of the
issue, a photo of female students from the school appeared, with the caption "Nude Photos: Girls
of Rancho." Id. According to the article, the July issue of Playboy magazine would carry nude
photographs of certain high school students and those interested should sign up. Id. The female
students in the photo were standing in a line with their purported applications in hand. Id.
Apparently, the publication did not obtain "totally informed consent" from the female students
depicted in the photograph. Id.
11 Leeb, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
146Id. at 497-98.
141
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1994).
,4Leeb, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 502. It was not enough under the statute that a lawsuit is merely
threatened. Id. at 503.
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As this case indicates, a few states do not follow Hazelwood, at least
in the student newspaper context. They have instead codified the Tinker
standard, requiring schools to show a material disruption of students'
education or potential tort liability before educators are permitted to restrict
what students choose to print in school newspapers.'49 Of the states that
have considered such legislation, 5 ' however, most have rejected it.',
5.

Extension of Hazelwood to the First Amendment Right of Association
Lower courts have also extended Hazelwood's precedent to restrict
First Amendment rights other than freedom of speech. For example, in
Bush v. Dassel-Cokato Board of Education,'52 a Minnesota district court
held that Tinker, when read in light of Fraser and Hazelwood, did not
prohibit schools from disciplining students who attended parties at which
alcohol was consumed.' 53 This decision extends Hazelwood's reach
beyond First Amendment speech issues to the First Amendment's right to
freedom of association, a facet of student "autonomy" that arguably reaches
beyond mere speech."'
6.

Cases Extending HazeIwood to University Settings
The Hazelwood Court expressly stated that it was withholding
judgment on whether its articulated standards would also apply in a
university setting.'55
Predictably, therefore, lower courts have not
consistently applied Hazelwood in cases involving universities.
In Bishop v. Aronov, 5 6 the Eleventh Circuit held that a university
did not violate the constitutional rights of a professor when it prohibited
him from making religious statements during class. The court applied the
' The only statute codifying the Tinker standard prior to Hazelwoodwas California's student
expression law. Salomone, supra note 19, at 302-06. Massachusetts, Iowa, and Kansas have
passed similar legislation since Hazelwood was decided. Id.
'5 As of 1992, approximately 22 states had considered such legislation. Id.
IS! States considering, but rejecting, legislation patterned after California's statute include
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Id; see also Anti-HazelwoodLegislationStalls
in Three States, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT vol. xvi, No. 3 (Fall 1995) (reporting that
Missouri, Nebraska, and Florida had each rejected Legislation designed to circumvent
Hazelwood).
112745 F. Supp. 562 (D. Minn. 1990).
153Id. at 569.
15Cf. City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988) (citing Hazelwood in
upholding city youth curfew ordinance).
'-5 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
1-56 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3026 (1992).
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public forum analysis set forth in Hazelwood, determining that the

classroom during instruction was not a public forum. 5 7 The court also

found that the University's actions in restricting the professor's speech

during class were reasonably related to a legitimate educational interest.5 8 The court also applied a version of the school-sponsorship
language from Hazelwood, holding that a teacher's language could be
perceived by students as being authorized by the university.'59
The Second Circuit, in Fox v. Board of Trustees,"6 refused to apply

Hazelwood to a university environment when a student challenged a
university regulation barring commercial product demonstrations in student
dormitories.

The court held that students have the right to receive

information in their dormitory rooms, which are not public forums.' 6'
The dissent would have applied HazeIwood to university speech and

permitted the university's action.'6 2
7.

Cases Applying Hazelwood to Student Speech At School-Sponsored
Assemblies and Graduation Ceremonies
Lower courts have applied Hazelwood to cases having a similar factual

setting to Fraser. That is, where students speak at school-sponsored
assemblies or graduation ceremonies, courts generally grant wide latitude

to school officials to restrict speech if they determine it would be in the
best educational interests of their students.

For instance, in Poling v. Murphy, 6 ' the Sixth Circuit in 1989 held
that the First Amendment does not give a high school student the right to
make admittedly discourteous and rude remarks about school officials
during a campaign speech delivered at a school-sponsored assembly. 64

' Id. at 1070-71. The court reasoned that no public forum existed "during instructional
periods . . . 'reserved for other intended purposes' viz., the teaching of a particular university
course for credit." Id. at 1071 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267).
'5 Id. at 1076.
's Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076. The court stated that the university may permissibly seek to
avoid the impression of "official sanction." Id.
1-o841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
61 Id. at 1211. For a discussion of the exercise of editorial control over the content of
university student newspapers, see Greg C. Tenhoff, Note, Censoring the Public University
Student Press:A ConstitutionalChallenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 511 (1991).
26 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit but did so on issues relating
to the constitutional limitations on commercial speech. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469 (1989).
' 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1989).
'64Id. The court noted that "[uintil recent years, lawyers and educators alike might have
found it puzzling that such a question should even be asked. Not today; the question is a serious
one under contemporary constitutional concepts . . . ." Id. at 758.
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Applying Hazelwood, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the
school district after explaining with some eloquence that civility is a
legitimate pedagogical concern. 65
In Brody v. Spang,' 6 the Third Circuit considered to what extent
religious speech may be included in a public high school graduation
ceremony. Although the court remanded the case for additional factual
findings, as part of its public forum analysis, the court indicated that, under
Hazelwood, it was unlikely that high school commencement exercises could
have been designated a public forum because the "process for setting the
format and contents of a graduation ceremony are more likely to resemble
the tightly controlled school newspaper policies at issue in Hazelwood than
the broad group access policies considered in [other Supreme Court
cases]."167
8.

The Equal Access Act Cases

Hazelwood reinforced the notion that actions taken by school officials
related to legitimate pedagogical objectives deserve protection from
aggressive constitutional scrutiny.'68 As a result, courts have also had to

The court reasoned as follows:
The universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the
academic, as the Supreme Court put it in Fraser.-schools must teach by example the
shared values of civilized social order." Sometimes. of course, these -shared values"
come in conflict with one another, independence of thought and frankness of expression
occupy a high place on our scale of values, or ought to. but so too do discipline.
courtesy, and respect for authority. Judgments on how best to balance such values may
well vary from school to school. Television has not yet so thoroughly homogenized us
that conduct deemed unexceptionable in New York City, for example, will necessarily
be considered acceptable in rural Tennessee.
Local school officials, better attuned than we to the concerns of the parents/taxpayers who employ them, must obviously be accorded wide latitude in choosing
which pedagogical values to emphasize, and in choosing the means through which
those values are to be promoted. We may disagree with the choices, but unless they
are beyond the constitutional pale we have no warrant to interfere with them. Local
control over public school, after all. is one of this nation's most deeply rooted and
cherished traditions.
Id. at 762-63 (citations omitted). The court also found compelling the facts that the speech was
held on school grounds and was part of a school-sponsored assembly. Id. at 262.
1-957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992).
167Id. at 1119. The court also noted that under Hazehvood. school officials must be permitted
to "retain the authority to refuse . . . to associate the school with any position other than
neutrality on matters of political controversy." Id. at 1122 (quoting Hazelvood, 484 U.S. at 272).
68 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260. 273 (1988) ("[W]e hold that educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."). see Nicholson v. Board of Educ. Torrance United
'
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determine whether school officials' actions vis-a-vis federal statutes
likewise require different treatment, 69 despite the difficulty of blending

the already unwieldy public forum analysis with statutory analysis. The
most common statute to be addressed by courts in this manner is the Equal

Access Act. 70
In Board of Education v. Mergens,'7 ' the Supreme Court held that
a public school's policy prohibiting use of school facilities for student
groups discussing religious topics violated the Equal Access Act because
other student groups were allowed to use the same facilities. 72 Even so,

the Court restated an underlying basis of the Court's decisions in
Hazelwood and Fraser: "we think that schools and school districts

nevertheless retain a significant measure of authority over the type of
officially recognized activities in which their students participate." 73
In another Equal Access Act case, Gregoire v. Centennial School
District,74 the Third Circuit determined that a school district's decision
to prohibit an evangelical youth organization from renting a school
auditorium for a religious presentation violated the Equal Access Act
because the school district had rented its auditorium to many other
community groups. A dissenting judge cited Hazelwood for the principle
that the school district's decision to restrict use of its facilities should be

Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (supporting this proposition): Seyfried v. Walton, 668
F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v. Andrews. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
169 See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that school
district's refusal to allow student religious group to meet in high school classroom did not violate
Equal Access Act), vacated, 496 U.S. 914 (1990).
'- 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988). The statute provides the following: "It shall be unlawful for any
public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open
forum to deny equal access. . . to. . .any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that
limited open forum. . ." § 4071(a). The statute determines that -[a] public secondary school has
a limited open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more
non-curriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during non-instructional time."
§ 4071(b).
1
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
1'The district court, relying on Hazelwood. had held that the school's denial of respondents'
request to use school facilities to discuss religious topics was reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. Id. at 233. In affirming the Eighth Circuit's reversal of the district court,
however, the Supreme Court found that some student groups' use of school's facilities during
non-instructional times was "noncurriculum related." 1d. at 243-47. Therefore, the school
maintained a "limited open forum" under the Equal Access Act, and was prohibited under the
Act from content-based discrimination against any particular student group who wished to meet
during non-instructional time. Id. at 247.
13 Id. at 240-41 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) and Bethel
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
7 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990).
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accorded deference, especially where a student group's activities could be
potentially disruptive.'7 5
Finally, in Clark v. Dallas Independent School District,"6 the
Northern District of Texas determined that Hazelwood did not apply to the
school district's policy prohibiting student groups from periodically meeting
near the school cafeteria after school to read the Bible and pray together.
The court held that because "the conduct at issue was voluntary, studentinitiated, and free from the imprimatur of school involvement," Tinker,
rather than Hazelwood, dictated the outcome of the case. Applying Tinker,
the court concluded that the school had not met its burden of showing that
"the restriction of [the students'] activity and expression was necessary to

avoid material and substantial interference with the operation of [the
school]."
9.

77

Other Applications of Hazelwood

A number of cases have cited Hazelwood for its use of public forum
analysis in determining whether restrictions on speech are permissible
under the First Amendment. Often, courts simply cite Hazelwood for the

proposition that a public school is usually not a public forum.7 8 In other
cases, courts use Hazelwood to analogize schools to other public facilities. 179

Id. at 1393 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
176806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
177 Id. at 120 (citation omitted).
178 See, e.g., Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist., 725 F. Supp. 965 (C.D. II1. 1989). In Nelson,
students seeking to distribute a non-denominational newspaper in a school's hallways and classrooms challenged a school's decision to prohibit such distribution. The court applied a public
forum analysis, concluding that school hallways and classrooms were non-public forums. The
court then held that school officials were allowed to impose reasonable regulations which
preserved the use for which the school was intended, "i.e. teaching fundamental values of public
school education." Id. at 974; see also Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trustees. 978 F.2d 403
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding interalia that teacher fired for various reasons does not have actionable
constitutional claim for access to school grounds when school officials prohibited such access).
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 133 (1993); Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir.
1989) (rejecting student religious group's claim that school officials had violated their First
Amendment rights by refusing to allow them to use high school classroom prior to start of school
day because under Hazelwood school's classroom does not constitute public forum), vacated. 496
U.S. 914 (1990).
"7 See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992). In Kreimer, a case
which received massive media attention at the time, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
a public library was a limited public forum permitted to promulgate certain rules regarding the
conduct of library patrons. Id. at 1262. In applying a public forum analysis to the library, the
court referred to Hazelwood for the proposition that the government opens a designated public
forum where "'by policy or practice [it permits] . . . indiscriminate use by the general public.'"
115
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Several courts have also cited language in Hazelwood as support for
such propositions as: (1) the education of children should be left to parents
and local school officials rather than judges;8 0 (2) restrictions on constitutional rights must be permitted under certain circumstances; 8 ' and (3)

school officials must have discretion to reasonably pursue legitimate
educational objectives."' z
D. The General Significance of Hazelwood
Now, 25 years after Tinker, students still retain the right of personal

expression on school grounds so long as that expression is not materially
disruptive."
Tinker, however, no longer protects speech that is delivered through school-sponsored activities, such as student newspapers or

assemblies. 8" Thus, school officials have much greater discretion in
making decisions that restrict students' short-term autonomy rights in the

Id. at 1259 n.13 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) quoting
Perry Edue. Assn. v. Perry Loc. Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
10 See, e.g., Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 789 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (upholding graduation requirement of 60 hours of community service), aff'd, 987 F.2d 489
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 85 (1993).
'8' While no Supreme Court opinion directly modifies or applies the standards set forth in
Hazelwood or Fraser, the Court has referred to those opinions as support for propositions
regarding the nature of a school environment and the necessity of age-based classifications. Most
recently, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992), the Supreme Court held
a "hate crimes" ordinance invalid. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted that "the
distinctive character of... a secondary school environment ...influences our First Amendment
analysis." Id. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
853 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Legislatures recognize the relative immaturity of
adolescents, and we have often permitted them to define age-based classes that take account of
this qualitative difference between juveniles and adults."). For a discussion of R.A.V., see
Thomas H. Moore, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to ProtectFree Speech,
71 N.C. L. REv. 1252 (1993).
18 For example, in Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist., 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2612 (1995), the court relied on Hazelwood to hold that schools have the
right to restrict the speech rights of guest lecturers as well as faculty and students if the restriction
is based on a legitimate educational objective. Id. at 722. In addition, in Wise v. Pea Ridge
School District, 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1988), the court rejected the appeal of summary judgment
granted against two students protesting application of a school district's corporal punishment
policy. In dictum, the court stated: "we note that our decision is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions which defer to school administrators in matters such as discipline and
maintaining order in the schools." Id. at 566 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266).
18 For a discussion of the aftermath of Tinker prior to the Hazelwood decision, see Shari
Golub, Tinker to Fraserto Hazelwood-Supreme Court'sDouble Play CombinationDefeats High
School Students'RallyforFirstAmendment Rights: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 487 (1988) (detailing Court's trend toward minimalizing students' rights).
18 Id. at 514 (criticizing Hazelwood for nullifying student's rights established in Tinker and
"endors[ing] the confusing and one-sided public forum analysis").
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interest of helping them to develop their capacity for future autonomy' 5
This change has been reflected in lower court decisions in nearly every
circuit since Hazelwood was decided.
1. Reinforcing the Role of Public Schools
We have described elsewhere the reason we believe the Hazelwood
decision is grounded on a theoretical approach that advances rather than
threatens the development of students' actual powers of expression."
In this sense, the Court has limited the de jure autonomy of students in a
way that promotes the de facto development of their actual capacity for
autonomous action.
The traditional presumptions of our legal and political structure that
protect and encourage school discretion are, like the very concept of
minority status for children, designed to benefit children by educating
them-that is, teaching them the knowledge and skills needed to act with
true autonomy. The nation's system of public education reflects a broadly
based social commitment to view children as legally privileged, not
disadvantaged. Children, by nature, lack intellectual and moral capacity,
yet because they are literally society's future, children have been deemed
entitled to education. Indeed, this nation's longstanding recognition of each
child's "right" to an education is one of the most enlightened and wellfunded declarations of human rights in the modern age."
But schools cannot educate their students without the authority, the
confidence, the financial support, and the public support needed to

Ill
See

LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, THE CHILD & THE STATE: A NORMATIVE THEORY OF

JUVENILE RIGHTS 57 (1980).

Adults have a duty to force or compel children to do those acts that will aid them in
becoming autonomous beings and to refrain from doing those acts that will hinder them
in attaining their goal, and this (natural) duty is derived from the child's (natural) right
to be provided the conditions that will allow him to realize his potential to become an

autonomous being.
Id.
See Hafen, supra note 23 (OHIO ST. L.J.); Hafen, supra note 31 (DUKE L.J.).
The right to an education has not been recognized by the federal courts. See San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying
it is implicitly so protected."). At the state level, the right to an education, "reached its pinnacle
in Serrano v. Priest, wherein the Supreme Court of California declared: 'We are convinced that
the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed, compels our
treatment of it as a fundamental interest.'" SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ,
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 132 (1987) (discussing and quoting Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 608-09 (1971)).
's
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implement effective educational programs. As James Coleman'88 and
others have demonstrated in their empirical studies, the decline in U.S.
student academic achievement during the 1970's and 1980's is clearly
linked to the decline in school authority that followed in the wake of Tinker
and the anti-authoritarian era it symbolized. Thus, we consider antiauthoritarian educational theories, such as the theories of A.S. Neill, to be
fundamentally misguided. Neill claims that a child is "innately wise and
realistic. If left to himself without adult suggestion of any kind, he will
develop as far as he is capable of developing."' 89 Children obviously
need education that teaches them the skills of critical thinking, including a
healthy skepticism about authority and authority figures. Students of all
ages also need ample opportunities to express themselves freely, with ever
increasing latitude to learn how to make decisions by making some and
living with their consequences. The Hazelwood Court determined that the
educational approaches that will best develop the minds and expressive
powers of public school students are rooted in educational philosophy, not
constitutional law. Thus, the Court recognized that judges should not
define the terms of curricular and extra-curricular educational programs.
It also implicitly recognized that schools should ground their authority and
their conceptual guidance not in the exceptional case law of First Amendment jurisprudence, but in their own educational expertise and in the broad
grants of state power that originally created our system of public schools.
Those decisions created the schools not as a national threat but as a national

treasure. 190
For such reasons, we resist the characterization of Hazelwood and its
lower court progeny as addressing a simple dichotomy between student
The community has enormous
autonomy and community control.
responsibility for public school students, not to control them-as if in
prison-but to teach them. Schools exist, therefore, to facilitate the
education-indeed the "liberation"-of children toward literal personal
autonomy. We know of no more potent children's liberation movement
than the establishment of American public schools. To liberate children
from ignorance and the shackles of their own uneducated capacity is to
recognize their right to "liberal"-that is, autonomy-creating-education.

'8 See JAMES S. COLEMEN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND
PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982).
"I ALEXANDER S. NEILL, SUMMERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CHILD REARING 4

(1960).
'" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (-[Education is perhaps the most
important function of the state and local governments.").
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Autonomy and the Toleration/Promotion Distinction

We wish to note one conceptual strength of the Hazelwood approach
that has applications in other contexts of constitutional analysis; namely, the
distinction the Court drew between what a school must tolerate and what
it must promote. As Professor Salomone has noted,
The Court defined the distinction between toleration and promotion as
follows:
[Toleration] addresses educators' ability to silence a student's
personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.
...[Promotion] concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.19
The Court in Board of Education v. Mergens later drew a similar
distinction in holding that, under the federal Equal Access Act, a high
school that had created a limited open forum must allow after-hours access
to its facilities by a student religious club:
[A] school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis .... The proposition that schools
do not endorse everything they fall to censor is not complicated ...
Although a school may not itself lead or direct a religious club, a school
thatpermits a student-initiated and student-led religious club to meet after
school, just as it permits any other student group to do, does not convey
a message of state approval or endorsement of the particular religion."1
Our comment on this distinction requires the creation of a brief conceptual
context.
As we have noted elsewhere, American law has historically placed all
personal conduct into one of three categories-protected, permitted, and
prohibited:
(1) protected conduct (such as political speech), which is protected by a
preferred constitutional right;
(2) permitted conduct (such as driving a car), which is the subject neither
of constitutional protection nor of unusual prohibitions; and
(3)prohibitedconduct (such as robbery), which is forbidden by a criminal
sanction or by a classificatory scheme that (sometimes harshly) excludes
persons in certain categories.

"I Salomone, supra note 42, at 267 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 271 (1988)).
"_ Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-52 (1990) (emphasis added).
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The law creates a natural spectrum with protected activity on one
extreme, prohibited activity on the other extreme, and a broad range of
permitted activity in the middle. We may say that sexual intimacy
between marriedpersons is protected by a constitutional right .... State
criminal laws against adultery and fornication place sexual relationships
between the unmarried in the prohibited category. If a legislature ...
[decriminalizes such conduct], sexual conduct between the unmarried
moves from category (3) to category (2)-it becomes permitted, even
though it is not yet protected ....

[But] if a court finds a state's

adultery and fornication laws unconstitutional, sexual conduct between
consenting adult takes on a protected status.. . . [Thus] decriminalization
decisions by the judiciary are likely to move conduct from category (3)
all the way across the spectrum to category (1). 113
In imagining a spectrum from (1) protected to (2) permitted to (3)
prohibited conduct, natural boundaries exist between categories (1) and (2),
and between categories (2) and (3), the boundary of "endorsement" and the
boundary of "tolerance."
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(2)
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The Court's analysis in Hazelwood gives meaning to both boundaries. The
Court held that a school must "endorse" or "sponsor" only those activities
the school chooses to place within its educational purpose, as determined
exclusively by school officials. Thus, we see the boundary between (1)
protected conduct and (2) permitted conduct as the point of "endorsement,"
meaning that the school determines for itself which forms of student

11 Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy;
Balancing the Individualand Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 546-47 (1983).
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expression it will place within its most "protected" sphere. Both its
students and the public are entitled to expect that activities in this category
have the school's complete institutional endorsement, and that such an
endorsement has substantial meaning.
We see the boundary between (2) permitted conduct and (3) prohibited
conduct as the point of "toleration," meaning that a school may be required
to "tolerate" or "permit" certain student activities that it does not
necessarily "endorse." The Hazelwood Court reaffirmed the holding of
Tinker, that the First Amendment requires a school to "tolerate" a student's
"personal speech" in non-educational settings even if the school would not
choose to include that expression within its endorsed or protected sphere,
94
so long as the expression is not disruptive to the school's functioning.
The Tinker students who wore black arm bands to protest the Vietnam War
were clearly within the "permitted" sphere, even though the school's
officials opposed the expression. 9 5
We find the distinction between tolerance and endorsement a useful
one, because in many constitutional-and simply public-contexts, the
public is confused by judicial results or language that blurs the tolerance/promotion distinction. That very blurring created rampant confusion
for years in lower courts about the meaning of Tinker. Once the Supreme
Court had held that schools must tolerate non-disruptive speech, many
courts missed the distinction between educational and non-educational
contexts, because they missed the distinction between tolerance and
endorsement. For instance, the lower courts in both Fraserand Hazelwood
held that the Tinker "tolerance" rule required schools to provide the
institutionally endorsed platform of a school assembly and a schoolsponsored newspaper for the offensive expression of individual students. 196
As Hazelwood now makes clear, it is one thing to require schools to
"tolerate" a student's offensive but non-disruptive personal expression, but
it is quite another when the alleged student autonomy theory that justifies
this tolerance runs to the unchecked extreme of requiring schools to
"promote" student expression that distorts the existing educational order
within the protected sphere of school-sponsored activities. When that

,94Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
'9 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) ("The
Constitution -says that Congress (and the state) may not abridge the right to free speech. This
provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speechconnected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.").
196See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1462-63 (D. Mo. 1985).
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happens, a school loses the institutional authority and discretion it must

have to carry out its educational mission. In addition, this distinction also
helps a school's students, and the public, understand that just because the
law requires tolerance of certain conduct, that conduct does not enjoy
official endorsement.
In public schools, as in other contexts, the institutional policies that

originate in the "protected" sphere usually reflect not merely an autonomy-based individual interest, but what Roscoe Pound called social
interests.197 Pound believed that a primary reason for protecting certain
individual interests in domestic relations law is that we thereby promote
society's own best long-term interests. 9 For example, ever since the
1920's, the Supreme Court has included within the "protected" constitutional sphere the relational interests of marriage and kinship' 99 and the
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. 2'
Yet the
Court has refused to include other personal relationships or the sexual

privacy of unmarried persons (straight or gay) within the protected
sphere. 2° 1 The constitutional distinction between married and unmarried
"I Roscoe Pound, IndividualInterestsin theDomestic Relations. 14 MIcH. L. REV. 177, 177
(1916); Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1943).
11 See Pound, supra note 197, at 196 (MICH. L. REV.). These long-term interests include,
"protection of dependent persons, and in the rearing and training of sound and well-bred citizens
for the future." Id.
"9See, e.g., Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that statute providing
for sterilization of habitual criminals violated equal protection clause).
I See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the
mere creature of the State: those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.").
11 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court has, of course, included the
right to elective abortion and the right to obtain and use contraceptives within this protected
sphere for both married and single persons. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Although some commentators have inferred a right of sexual privacy
from these decisions, our analysis of the constitutional interests involved shows otherwise. See
Hafen, supra note 216, at 538-44 (MICH. L. REV.).
The civil rights movements of the past generation were concerned primarily with moving
the choices and needs of women and racial minorities from being merely "permitted" to being
legally "protected" by potent anti-discrimination laws. During most of this same era, gays and
lesbians sought to move their choices and needs from being "prohibited" to being "permitted,"
through decriminalization of their private conduct. But when autonomy theories assume that
conduct long considered deviant should move all the way from "prohibited" to the exclusive
realm of "protected," those theories alter the analysis in ways that potentially alter our reasons
for maintaining protected classifications in the first place.
In advocating constitutional protection for homosexual privacy, Justice Blackmun made no
serious claim that homosexual relationships deserve to be included within the time-honored
category of marital and family relationships. Bowers. 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This category has been granted constitutional protection because of the high degree of social, as
well as individual, interests in stable laws dealing with marriage and kinship. Griswold v.
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persons springs primarily from the Court's recognition that the obligations
of parenthood, marriage, and biological kinship are fundamental to
preserving a civilized order. Thus those obligations are worthy of being
constitutionally protected, not merely tolerated, by the law.
Similarly, the right of children to receive an education deserves special
protection20 2 because education serves not only children's individual
interests, but also the long-term social interests of democratic societies,
which utterly depend on having a well-educated and stable citizenry. The
Court has also excluded obscenity from the realm of expression protected
by the First Amendment, in part because obscene expression lacks "social

value."

203

In all of these illustrative situations, both "individual" interests and
"social" interests play some role in defining the contours and the purposes
of the most protected constitutional categories. The very idea of "personal
autonomy," however, inherently takes a non-negotiable stance. Autonomy
arguments not only typically fail to establish high social value, but they
often thrive on challenging the existing order of social stability. The power
of the protected sphere to communicate society's endorsement and
sponsorship tells us that our system does not, and should not, "protect"
everything it "tolerates." At the same time, past patterns of constitutional
analysis have often unintentionally confused the distinction between state
tolerance and state promotion, thereby confusing the distinction between

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). On the contrary. Justice Blackmun's dissent would protect
homosexual privacy not because it -contribute[s] . . .to the general public welfare, but because
[it] forms so central a part of an individual's life." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J..
dissenting). This language illustrates how autonomy arguments lay little claim to social interests.
other than the arguable social interest of preserving every person's autonomous choices.
Without consciously identifyingHazelvood's distinction between tolerance and endorsement,
the American public has grown more tolerant of ahomosexual lifestyle. Yet the public also resists
the absolutist autonomy claims of gay rights advocates who claim the socially legizimizing
endorsement of protected legal preferences, such as same-sex marriage. The public is now willing
to "permit"-that is, it would not "prohibit" - such lifestyle choices even if it does not wish to
"protect" them. According to recent press accounts, public attitudes draw a clear line between
"passive toleration" and -active support" of homosexual conduct. Richard Bernstein, When One
Person's Civil Rights Are Another's Moral Outrage, N.Y. TwMES. Oct. 16, 1994, § 4. at 6:
Dennis, Shaky. Ground: Gay Rights Confront Determined Resistance From Some Moderates.
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7. 1994, at Al. The Hazelwood analogy is a useful analytical tool for
determining how to ensure legal tolerance of formerly "prohibited" conduct by "permitting" that
conduct without also giving it the normative endorsement of a "protected" constitutional status.
I The Supreme Court, however, has not yet held that the right to receive an education is
a "fundamental" interest. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,37-38
(1973).
1 E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. 484-85 (1957) (holding that statute prohibiting
mailing of obscene material was not violative of either First Amendment or Due Process rights).
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what the law merely permits and what it protects. For this reason, Tinker
and Hazelwood together offer a needed and illuminating illustration of
constitutional reasoning that has potential applications well beyond the
context of student rights.

